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Abstract: 
The sub-prime crisis of 2008 in the US shook the world markets through financial market integration, 
global trade links, and international banking diversification. The financial crisis led to changes in 
various policies both at macroeconomic and firm-level around the world. In this scenario, this study is 
an attempt to identify and uncover the changes in firm and institutional determinants of Debt Financing 
Ratio in India, before and after the crisis.  Micro and macro panel data of 306 non-financial Indian listed 
firms were used for the period of 2002-2017 to study the factors affecting leverage. Two-step system 
GMM was employed to study the dynamics of leverage and its determinants during 2002-2008 (pre-
crisis period) and 2009-2017 (post-crisis period). Pre and post-crisis analysis are undertaken by 
employing firm-specific factors represented by Non-debt tax shields, Asset Composition (tangibility), 
Size, Profitability, Growth Opportunity (Market to Book), and Liquidity in the firms and institutional 
factors represented by Economic Growth Rate and Inflation. Two models, with different measures of 
leverage as dependent variables, have been constructed to analyse the impact of the crisis. The results 
favoured that the Indian firms tend to adjust their capital structure to reach an optimum level of debt 
(Target Leverage). The study confirms that profitability, and size of the firm are robust determinants of 
leverage in both pre and post-crisis periods; tangibility is found to be insignificant in the pre-crisis 
period and statistically significant in the post-crisis period for both measures of leverage. Market to 
Book (MTB) ratio is consistently a non-significant factor for book measure of leverage, and it holds 
significant negative relation to the market measure of leverage. Based on the model employing the book 
measure of leverage as a dependent variable, the factors tangibility and liquidity show different 
behaviour in pre and post-crisis period. They are not found to be significant during the pre-crisis period 
but after the crisis, they show significance in the determination of leverage of Indian non-financial 
firms. Economic indicators show a negative relation of inflation with leverage in the pre-crisis period 
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and positive relation in the post-crisis period. Economic growth measured through GDP does not show 
significance during the pre-crisis period but shows a positive influence in the post-crisis period. 
 Keywords: Corporate Capital Structure, Dynamic Panel Data, GMM.    
JEL Classifications: G20, G32. 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The recent financial turmoil of 2008, caused by lending to the subprime borrowers in the USA, has 
shaken the world and confirmed the phrase “When US sneezes the whole world catches cold."  
The crisis bankrupted major financial and insurance companies in the US. Since the globalization has 
converted the world economy into a unit, other economies in the world could not remain unaffected 
leading to rejection of “Decoupling theory” (Subbarao, 2009). During the turmoil, firms faced problems 
of paying fixed financial obligation as the major part of the financial obligation for a firm is found to 
be in the form of interest on Debt. World trade declined by 2.8 percent. Further, Indian firms faced 
problems in raising funds from outside; decrease in foreign consumption led to a reduction in export 
and downturn of Lehman Brothers led to be cautious, and stringent actions by domestic banks (2 
(Subbarao, 2009). 
Impact of Sub Prime Crisis on India is also seen indirectly through Capital Market slowdown. Inverse 
capital inflows by FII’s lead to crash of the Indian Stock Market. The falling equity prices during the 
onset of crisis further led to increasing market leverage. This financial and macro-economic instability 
led to decline in GDP growth rate by 2.1 percent, and current account deficit shot up to 2.6 percent of 
GDP, which is highest since economic reforms in India (Bajpai, 2011).  
The Sub Prime Crisis 2008 changed the financing decisions for most of the countries; since during the 
crisis, risk and uncertainty rise, expected returns decline and long-term financing becomes unattractive 
[ (R. S. Gürkaynak, 2012); (C. D Dick, 2013)]. The crisis induces an economy to experience higher 
volatility in the performance of firms, inflation, exchange rate, rate of interest, risk etc. This provides 
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an opportunity to study the relevance of idiosyncratic and institutional factors for financing decisions 
of the firm (Asli Demirguc-Kunt, 2015). 
These macroeconomic instabilities induced by global financial turmoil provided an opportunity to 
analyse how firms finance their investment needs, before and after the macroeconomy instability caused 
by the global crisis.  
With the same stream of thoughts, this study has attempted to analyse the impact of Sub Prime Crisis 
on Indian firms’ financing decisions. Here, firstly, the major institutional (GDP growth rate and 
Inflation), as well as firm-specific factors (Last year’s leverage, NDTS, Tangibility, Size, Profitability, 
Growth Opportunities and Liquidity), are identified, based on previous studies [ (Sheridan Titman, 
1988), (Rajan, 1995), (Laurence Booth, 2001), (Murray Z. Frank, 2003), (Frank & Goyal, 2009), (L. 
M. Bhole, 2005)].    
 Secondly, the study has tried to examine whether the determinants are independent for Indian firms’ 
DFR in the light of Sub Prime Crisis employing Dynamic Panel Data Model and applying Two-Step 
System GMM for estimating the parameters of the model to resolve the problem of endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity of explanatory variables present in a Dynamic Panel Data framework. 
The study is divided into five sections and proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the review of 
literature, research gaps and rationale for the study. Section III contains data description and descriptive 
statistics. Section IV consists of data and research methodology, and the last Section V discusses the 
results and concludes the study. 
 
II. Review of Literature 
The prime objective of any business is to maximize the owner’s wealth, and this may be achieved by 
accepting projects that provide excess returns over the cost of borrowing. The Cost of Capital is the 
weighted average cost of capital for the amount invested from different sources i.e Debt and Equity, in 
the firm hence cost of capital is the minimum acceptable earning rate for a project. Consequently, while 
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raising finance a firm must choose an optimal combination of debt and equity that minimizes overall 
Cost of Capital.   
Debt is considered a cheaper source of finance because the cost of debt is generally found to be lower 
than the cost of equity as interest paid on Debt is tax-deductible. Further, Debt introduction reduces 
agency costs and brings operating efficiency for firms having free cash flows (Palepu, 1986).    
However, Interest and Principal repayments to debt claimants are known in advance and in case the 
cash flows are not enough to meet the promised debt claimants, it may lead the firm to insolvency – 
which of course is disastrous for all the stakeholders. Insolvency process leads to the incurrence of 
direct and indirect bankruptcy costs such as legal fee, loss in the value of assets etc. Further, the 
managers strive to work for owners neglecting the high risk to bondholders and create agency costs of 
debt. In such a situation, debt holders’ demand for a higher interest rate as risk premium makes debt a 
fairly unattractive source of funding. [ (Myres, 1977), (Jensen, 1986)].  
Equity is another important source of finance. The equity holders are the owners of any firm, take active 
part in management of the firm, have infinite life and they get the least priority at the time of liquidation. 
Generally, equity issues are found to be underpriced and Initial Equity Issues might be underpriced up 
to 10 to 15 percent on an average (Roger G. Ibbotson, 1994). 
 Therefore, determining the optimum level of Debt Financing Ratio (henceforth DFR) and equity 
proportion in business is always a matter of interest among the practitioners and academicians. In the 
following paragraphs, the prominent researches in this area are discussed. 
The starting point of financing decision making is the seminal work of (Durand, 1952) advocating that 
debt is cheaper and an easier source of finance than equity for US firms and increases the value of the 
firm. “Irrelevance Theory” proposed by (Franco Modigliani, 1958) refuted David Durand’s theory and 
stated that with stiff assumptions, the composition of funds is not related to the value of the firm. In 
another paper, (Miller, 1963)) suggests that if the earnings are known with certainty and in the presence 
of taxes, the firm’s value is a positive linear function of financial leverage. Subsequent researches 
violated the stiff assumptions made by Modigliani and Miller (MM) and correlated them with the costs 
and benefits of debt. Those researchers recommended that an optimum level of debt is possible where 
“present value of tax benefits of using debt” is more than the “present value of expected financial 
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distress costs”. This got propagated as Trade-Off Theory of capital structure [ (Litzenberger, 1973) , 
(Jensen, 1986) (Myres, 1977), (Myers, 1984) ]. Debt creates a tax advantage for a firm and needs to be 
used cautiously; else, it can lead a firm to bankruptcy too. There is an optimum amount of debt (D*) 
that a firm can afford to take and that is established by clearly understanding the trade-offs involved. 
This D* is seen to be inversely related to the intangible assets owned by the firm   [ (Litzenberger, 
1973), (Myres, 1977)].  
The study now elaborates the firm-specific & institutional factors mentioned in the Tradeoff Theory 
and related to marginal benefits and the marginal costs mentioned above. It has been observed in the 
studies that the DFR for firms tends to increase with Tax Rate, Fixed Assets, Size, Profitability 
and Inflation (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Interest on the payments made towards debt provides tax 
shield to the firm, by the governments. Fixed Assets serve as collateral and thereby allow easier 
access to debt financing along with the reduction in agency costs. Large firms tend to diversify 
their businesses with an objective of spreading the risk thin and as a result are expected to have 
a lower probability of losses and subsequent default on the debt repayment. This makes such 
businesses an attractive proposition for the lenders to invest. Profitable firms, since they have 
free cash flows, tend to have a lower probability of failure and are more inclined to exploit tax 
benefits that debt financing offers. It is also observed that liquidity is directly correlated with DFR 
because it is indicative of short term solvency and provide information to a lender for meeting financial 
obligation (L. M. Bhole, 2005).  
 During times of high inflation, tax benefits are generally found to be more than the cost 
associated with debt, therefore the firms increase their DFR [  (Harry DeAngelo, 1980); 
(Jensen, 1986); (Warner, 1977)]. On the other hand, DFR of firms tends to decrease with 
unpredictability and variation in cash flows as well as when the firms are pursuing high growth 
opportunities. It is so because a variation in the cash flows essentially arising from the uncertain 
business conditions, leads to a high probability of financial distress as well as debt agency 
costs. Also, during the times of volatile cash flows, since the cost of debt tends to be higher, it 
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would impact the benefits that the firm can get in the form of “Tax Shield”. It was also evident 
in the literature that debt as an instrument of adding discipline in the business was found to be 
less utilized in incumbent firms that expect high growth opportunities in the future and creates 
the problems of asset substitution and underinvestment. Therefore, such firms tend to have 
lower leverage. Further, during bankruptcy, growth opportunities are more likely to lose 
liquidation value [ (Myres, 1977); (Jensen, 1986); (Myers, 1984); (Frank & Goyal, 2009)]. 
The study now explores the literature on the Pecking Order Theory, which postulates that due to the 
presence of adverse selection, information asymmetry and mispricing of seasoned equity, firms 
follow a hierarchy during the times when funds are required. Internal financing in such times 
becomes the first choice whereas seasoned equity is at the last in the pecking order of the means 
of raising funds. Debt in this sort of a situation is treated as safer than equity [( (Donaldson, 
1961); (S. C. Myers, 1984)]. According to Pecking Order Theory, DFR tends to decline with 
tangibility, liquidity, firm size and profitability whereas it increases with an increase in growth 
opportunities because the lower degree of “Information Asymmetry” and “Agency Costs” are 
associated with a high degree of tangibility in the firms. Therefore, equity is preferable for financing 
deficit than debt when the firm has high tangibility. Since the large firms are monitored closely by the 
investors; they release the information in the time leading to a lower degree of information asymmetry 
and prefer to use seasoned equity instead of debt financing. For profitable firms, it is argued that since 
they have more retained earnings, therefore they use internal equity as a method of financing and abstain 
from issuing debt and external equity. However, if the retained earnings or other internal sources of 
finance are insufficient, not only debt is preferred, but it is also easily available and at better terms. 
When the firms pursue growth, beyond a stage, their internal financing proves to be insufficient to fund 
the growth opportunities, therefore leverage increases. [( (S. J. Grossman, 1982); (Harris Milton, 1991)]. 
The support to the Pecking Order Theory was also confirmed in a pronounced survey research (J. R. 
Graham and C. R. Harvey, 2001) which concluded that the management and owners of the firms prefer 
to use internal financing more because they want to keep the external finance for the future and maintain 
7 
 
flexibility in terms of the capital needed. In addition to Trade-Off and Pecking order models of capital 
financing, convincible literature favors that the firms ignore the D* and hierarchy in case of financing 
deficit (Marsh, 1982), but take the advantage of mismatched financial markets. They issue more equity 
when the stock prices rise and vice-versa. This phenomenon is termed as “Market Timing Theory” and 
is applicable for equity and debt both. Researchers have proven this phenomenon empirically [(Marsh 
(1982)]. Further, as the market value of the firm increases because of rising equity prices, the leverage 
declines and to bring the DFR at an optimum level, a firm has to issue more debt (Taggart, 1977), 
(Malcolm Baker, 2002). Subsequently, researchers nominated some idiosyncratic, systematic and 
international factors related to the firms, connected those with Trade-Off Theory, Pecking Order Theory 
or Market Timing Theory and thereafter provided their opinion for the relevance of theory.  Thereafter 
researches evolved for testing the influence of idiosyncratic factors and identifying the relevance of 
different theories. For instance, some notable studies in this field [ (R. Stulz, 1985); (Frank & Goyal, 
2009)] favor Trade-Off Theory and partially advocate the applicability of Pecking Order Theory. None 
of the studies has found evidence for following any theory to explain the variation in DFR. In Indian 
context one of the major studies was carried out by (Bhaduri, 2002) confirmed the correlation between 
leverage and growth, cash flows, size, uniqueness and industrial characteristics. (Chakraborty, 2010) 
explored the applicability of Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order Theory for Indian firms and observed 
that, Indian firms tend to follow the views of Pecking Order Theory while making financing decision 
with respect to DFR.  
Apart from the other theories, researchers have identified other micro and macro-economic factors that 
may affect the financing decisions of the firm. In the literature lagged leverage is found to be positively 
correlated with the current leverage and states that companies attempt to attain an optimal level of debt 
in the capital structure (Flannery & Rangan, 2006).  It was also argued in the literature that DFR in the 
firm heavily depends upon the industry’s DFR, individual percentage of leverage in each firm is found 
to be around the mean value of the industry as a whole because firms follow a leader in the industry 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009). Some of the researchers also claimed that the DFR of the firms depends upon 
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the number of rival’s incumbent firm. The oligopoly market firms tend to have a higher DFR than that 
of other forms of the market (Tracy, 1986). 
The DFR is highly dependent on the institutional set up of a country too, in which the firms are operating 
because it is affected by monetary and fiscal policies of the country. The major institutional factors 
identified in the literature are economic growth rate (generally GDP), expected inflation and long-term 
rate of interest, with their different proxies and are connected to the existing theories. GDP growth rate 
has a major impact on the profits and income of firms. During expansion, the profit and income of the 
firms increase, and they tend to use retained earnings to finance their projects. Hence, a negative 
relationship is observed between economic growth and DFR. During the times of high inflation, the real 
value of tax benefits increases and so does the DFR (Taggart, 1977) .  
The studies mentioned above are majorly in the context of developed nations like United States, United 
Kingdom, European and developed markets. In the Indian context, a recent study conducted by 
(Herwadkar, 2017) examined the impact of various macro factors like volatility in the domestic market, 
world growth rates, FED shadow rate and found that the DFR has an inverse relation with FED shadow 
rate.  
However, the above cited references applied fixed effect or random effect panel data models 
and ignored the presence of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity of explanatory 
variables in Panel Data framework which might have caused inefficient and biased estimates 
of the parameters of the considered models and inconsistent findings 
Though a vast literature is available on the financing decisions of firms, but very limited attempts have 
been made to study the impact of macro-economic factors and almost none of the researches have 
studied the impact of the Sub Prime crisis on the determinants of capital structure decisions of Indian 
firms It is evident from previous studies [ (Asli Demirguc-Kunt, 2015); (Herwadkar, 2017)]   that crisis 
brings instability in the financial system and whole country may experience recession and slow growth. 
This leaves a research gap to study the impact of the global financial crisis on determinants of DFR. 
This study attempts to identify relevant firm specific and institutional factors that may have the power 
to explain variations in DFR and ascertain the impact of crisis on debt financing decisions of Indian 
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non-financial firms. A Dynamic Panel Data framework is used by employing Two-Step System GMM 
for estimating the parameters of the models to resolve the problem of endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity of explanatory variables. 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
This study has used annual data for the period 2001-02 to 2016-17, extracted from financial statements 
of each firm. Micro panel data has been taken from DATASTREAM terminal of “Thomson Reuters” 
and Bloomberg. The data on Inflation and GDP growth rate has been extracted from the World Bank’s 
websites. The study includes 306 non-financial companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE).  
Based on previous studies and as per the objective of this research, the following model has been 
adopted: 
DFR = f ( DFRt-1 , Non debt tax shield, Tangibility, Profit, Size, Growth, Liquidity, Inflation, and GDP)                             
 
The main explanatory variables are NDTS, Asset Composition, Size, Profitability, Growth Opportunity, 
and Liquidity in the firms. Institutional factors are Economic Growth Rate and Inflation. The formation 
of these variables is explained in Annexure 1. The selected firms belong to different broad sectors as 
given in Table 1.  
Table 1 Sectoral presentation of firms included in the study. 
Sector Firms Percentage 
Non-Financial Services 56 18.30% 
Fuels, Heavy, and Electrical Equipment 46 15.03% 
Auto & Ancillary 30 9.80% 
Construction, Cement and Steel 48 15.69% 
Textile, and Packaging 35 11.44% 
Pharmaceutical, Chemical and Fertilisers 53 17.32% 
Consumer Durable, Sugar and FMCG 38 12.42% 
Total  306 100% 
 
It is evident from Table 1 that the 56 firms belong to the non-financial service industry. It includes 
Shipping, Telecom, Information Technology and Media. 46 firms are from Industries such as Petrol, 
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Gas, Electricity, Heavy Goods and Equipment. In the sample, 30 firms are engaged in Auto and its 
ancillaries. 48 firms belong to construction, cement and steel industry. Textile and packaging industry 
firms are 35. 53 firms are from Pharmaceutical, Chemical and Fertilizers and lastly. 38 firms belong to 
Consumer Durable, Sugar Industry and Fast-Moving Consumer Goods. 
Table 2 describes the descriptive statistics of the above collected data; it presents the results for the full 
sample period i.e. 2002 to 2017 of 306 companies and 4366 observations.  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics1 
Statistics BDFR MDFR NDTS TANGB PROFIT SIZE MTBRATIO LIQ INFLATION GDP 
 Mean 0.3602 0.2889 0.0341 0.3688 0.123 9.514 2.535 2.052 0.067 0.069 
 Median 0.3475 0.1965 0.0307 0.3753 0.115 9.436 0.702 1.597 0.058 0.079 
 Maximum 1.063 0.952 0.1461 0.7873 0.417 14.09 39.11 11.152 0.119 0.086 
 Minimum 0.00001 0.0001 0.0012 0.0124 -0.10 6.058 0.027 0.286 0.024 0.031 
 Std. Dev. 0.2483 0.2772 0.0221 0.1913 0.086 1.611 5.650 1.628 0.028 0.016 
 Skewness 0.366 0.7935 1.901 0.0780 0.472 0.407 4.513 3.030 0.401 -1.180 
 Kurtosis 2.482 2.4217 9.492 2.156 4.24 3.231 25.83 15.08 1.90 3.094 
 J/B Stats. 146.3 519.0 10298 133 445 130 109645 33232 336 1018 
 P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs. 4366 4366 4366 4366 4366 4366 4366 4366 4366 4366 
Levin-Chui 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 2 exhibits that the data used in the study is highly volatile as the mean values of all dependent 
and independent variables are deviated from the mean of the observations. All variables are non-
normally distributed as the p-values of Jarque-Bera statistics reject the null hypothesis of normality for 
all variables. For the possibility of any long-run association, study checked the stationarity using two 
methods namely “Levin-Lin-Chu” and “PP - Fisher”2, and found that data considered in the study is 
stationary for all variables at the level and first difference.  
It is visible from the table that only GDP growth rates are having negative skewness while all other 
variables are positively skewed. It is also evident from the table that market-based debt finance ratio 
(henceforth MDFR) and book-based debt financing ratio (henceforth BDFR) are non-negative.  
                                                            
1 Abbreviations: BDFR: Book Debt Financing Ratio, MDFR: Market Debt Financing Ratio, NDTS: Non-Debt Tax Shield, Tangb: Tangibility of assets, MTB 
Ration: Market Value to Book Value Ratio,LIQ: Liquidity, GDP: Gross domestic product, Std. Dev.: standard Deviation and rest of the words used are self-
explanatory. ** Stationary after removing time trend. 
2 The results are given in appendix 2. 
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Based on the data it may be inferred that Indian companies carried around 36 percent of their assets as 
fixed assets, the NDTS is 3 percent of assets in place and firms earned around 12 percent rate of returns 
on the amount invested, carried twice of their current liabilities as current assets. India experienced 
growth at 6.9 percent and inflation during this period was approximately 6.7 percent.  For the sake of 
clarity and to examine the behaviour of dependent variables during the study period, the mean value of 
the dependent variable is also presented year-wise graphically. 
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It is evident from the graph that mean BDFRs show substantial instability over time. Mean value of 
BDFR is more stable than mean MDFR. Further, the mean values of BDFR and MDFR have been 
declining over time, but MDFR was more volatile than the BDFR. The only difference between these 
two measures is the inclusion of the market value of equity. Consequently, MDFR skyrocketed during 
the 2008-09, while BDFR did not respond as much as MDFR. It is further noted that amid of financial 
crisis and unstable market environment. The low market value of equities led to a sharp increase in the 
leverage during 2008-09. This is the reason that some people prefer to use the Book leverage as a 
representation for the measurement of leverage (J. R. Graham and C. R. Harvey, 2001) . In this study, 
both measures of leverage have been used to identify the impact on both book and market measures. It 
is further evident that after the crisis, Indian companies have reduced the proportion of debt in their 
DFR irrespective of their proxies. The possible reasons may be, that during and after the crisis, financial 
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intermediaries increase their term premium as the probability of default rises. Also during the crisis 
firms value their financial flexibility that leads to decrease in long term debt  [ (R. S. Gürkaynak, 2012); 
(C. D Dick, 2013), (Zhiguo, 2014)]. These reasons make long term debt less lucrative. 
Subsequently, study has presented the results of the coefficient of correlation to ensure the association 
of variables. The next table 3 exhibits the pairwise correlation of all included variables in the study. 
Table 3 Coefficients of Correlation: 
Variables NDTS TANGB SIZE PROFIT MBRATIO LIQ INFLATION GDP 
NDTS 1.000 0.419 -0.039 0.239 0.051 -0.091 -0.068 0.010 
TANGB 0.419 1.000 0.029 0.057 -0.072 -0.178 -0.036 -0.006 
SIZE -0.039 0.029 1.000 0.110 0.045 -0.254 0.141 0.027 
PROFIT 0.239 0.057 0.110 1.000 0.375 0.074 -0.031 0.000 
MBRATIO 0.051 -0.072 0.045 0.375 1.000 0.047 -0.099 0.046 
LIQ -0.091 -0.178 -0.254 0.074 0.047 1.000 -0.035 0.005 
INFLATION -0.068 -0.036 0.141 -0.031 -0.099 -0.035 1.000 -0.127 
GDP 0.010 -0.006 0.027 0.000 0.046 0.005 -0.127 1.000 
 
The matrix shows that none of the independent variables is highly correlated. The highest correlation is 
observed between NDTS and Tangibility i.e. 41.9%. This shows that the assumption of no 
multicollinearity is satisfied. In the next section, the research methodology is discussed in detail. 
IV Research Methodology 
To study the effects of idiosyncratic and institutional factors on DFR, the standard approach is to use 
multiple regression and OLS along with its standard assumptions. In the literature, it has been used 
extensively by the researchers [ (Rajan, 1995); (Murray Z. Frank, 2003) (Frank & Goyal, 2009)] 
Following the same pattern, Equation 1 below models this study: 
DFRit = α+ λDFRit-1 +β1NDTSit+ β2Tangbit+ β3Profitit+ β4Sizeit+ β5MTBit+ β6Liquidityit + β7Inflationt+ 
β8GDPt+eit……………..…………………………………………………………….……………….(1) 
Equation 1 states that DFR of the firm ‘i’ for time ‘t’ depends upon the previous DFR, Non-Debt Tax 
Shield, the proportion of fixed assets in the business, earning capacity, size, market to book ratio and 
liquidity of the firm. The DFR at the institutional level depends upon the inflation and growth rate of 
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the country, presented by the growth rate in GDP. Since this study investigates the role of financial 
variables of the firms and institutional factors in determining DFR, this may lead to time series and 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Therefore, the model is re-written in panel data format also known as the 
Fixed Effect Model, given in Equation 2 below by introducing αi 
DFRit = αi + λDFRit-1+ β1NDTSit+ β2Tangbit+ β3Profitit+ β4Sizeit+ β5MTBit+ β6Liquidityit + β7Inflationit+ 
β8Rateit+ β9GDPit+eit………….……………………………………………………………………….(2) 
 
Equation 2 represents the panel data where i = 1 to 305 and t =2002 to 2017, Now coefficients in 
equation (2) may be computed using OLS if the error term satisfies all the standard assumptions. The 
number of coefficients to be estimated in equation 2 will be individual for 305 firms along with 10 
coefficients of explanatory variables, therefore computing more estimates with the help of limited 
information would not lead to precise estimates. Now coming to the further development of the model,  
Re-writing the equation (2) in a concise format in equation (3) below with an assumption that the 
individual effect ‘αi’ is a random variable and is included in the error term. This is also known as 
Random Effect Model.    
Yit= α+ λ Yi,t-1+ βXit+υit …………………………………………………….……………….Equation 3 
In equation 3, Yit is a vector specifying leverage of the firm ‘i’ for time ‘t’, Yt-1 is a vector of immediate 
past leverage of the firm, β denotes 8x1 vector of coefficients, Xit represents 1x8 vector of explanatory 
regressors and υit is the composite error term.  
It is further stated that υit= αi+ eit. . In equation 3 it is evident that Yit and Yit-1 are function of αi, because 
αi is time-invariant.  Therefore, Yit-1= α+δYi,t-2+βXit-1+υit-1 and the resulting error term cannot be 
independent.  It is further noticed using Hausman Test, that the individual effects “αi” are not random 
variable and further, E(Xit eit ) ≠ 0, variables such as NDTS, Tangibility, Size, Profitability and Liquidity 
are endogenous and they are correlated with the error term. Under such conditions standard OLS 
estimates will be biased and inconsistent, which further leads to the invalid point and interval estimates.  
Using the first difference operator study transforms the equation 3 as below 
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Yit-1= λ Yi,t-2+ βXit-1+υit-1…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….Equation 4 
Subtracting equation 4 from 3 we get the following 
Yit - Yit-1= λ (Yi,t-1 - Yi,t-2 )+ β(Xit - Xit-1)+ νi+ eit - νi - eit-1……………………………… ……………………..….Equation 5 
∆ Yit = λ ∆ Yi,t-1  + β ∆ Xit + ∆eit ………………………………………………………………..………………………………..Equation 6 
In equation 6, time-invariant effect has been eliminated, (Arellano Manuel, 1991) proposed the GMM 
to the estimation of coefficients of equation 6. Here in equation 6, it is also stated that the differenced 
variables will be instruments for main regression equation 1, and will eliminate all time-invariant and 
constant effects. This would solve the problem of endogeneity and the resulting error terms will be 
uncorrelated. To test the validity of the instrument in equation 6, ‘Sargan’s Test’ has been adopted  
(Arellano Manuel, 1991). 
The hypothesis of overidentification is rejected and p-value of Sargan test is close to zero which 
validates that the instruments used in (Arellano Manuel, 1991) estimators may not be efficient. 
It is stated in the literature [ (Bover, 1995); (Bond, 1998); (Roodman, 2009)] that if the first differences 
of instruments are uncorrelated with individual effects. If the dependent variable is persistent then 
differenced GMM may yield biased and inefficient estimates. This inefficiency may rise when time 
span is small. This provides an opportunity to introduce more instruments to improve the efficiency of 
the estimates.  Consequently, “Two-Step System GMM” advocated by (Bond, 1998) model has been 
used with the assumption of stationarity in the level form. This approach works through a set of 
equations i.e. level equation and transformed equation (First Difference) with two-moment condition 
i.e. covariance between the composite error term and lagged difference of Xit-1 and Yit-1 should be zero. 
This supports the use of the lagged difference of Yit as instruments of the level equation in addition to 
the lagged levels of Yit as instruments of first differenced equations (Baltagi, 2014). This method 
increases the instruments used to estimate the parameter that further improves the efficiency of the 
model. 
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For the validity of the model, the study further tested the autocorrelation of the model up-to two lags 
and found that none of the models rejects the hypothesis of “there is no autocorrelation” for second lag 
which is a pre-requirement of applying, System GMM3. Hence the results may be taken as ‘good’ 
estimates. The results of Arellano Bond Autocorrelation for lag (1) and lag (2) are given in Table 4 in 
Appendix 3.  
Since “no autocorrelation hypothesis” is not rejected in the lag (2) it means that the model does not 
suffer from autocorrelation, and the estimates are efficient. The study has also documented that 
standard errors of estimates4 are dramatically reduced when it used Two-Step System GMM 
as compared to Differenced GMM, One-Step System GMM along with Fixed Effect Method 
and Random Effect Model. Thus, the methodology of Two-Step System GMM used for 
estimating parameters in a dynamic panel data framework is best suited. 
 
V. Discussion of Results 
The results of this study are presented in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 for whole sample period [2001-
02 to 2016-17], Pre-Crisis Period [20001-02 to 2007-08], and Post Crisis Period [2009-10 to 2016-17] 
separately for Book Leverage and Market Leverage, respectively.  Table 8 summarizes the significant 
factors determining the DFR in all three periods and for both measures of DFR. 
Table 5 Two-Step System GMM results. 
Full Sample Period 2002-2017 
Dep. Variable  BDFR MDFR 
Lag (1)  0.808*** 0.576*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
NDTS -0.521*** -0.629*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
TANGB 0.0886*** 0.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability -0.559*** -0.793*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.00361 0.0000681 
 (0.249) (0.986) 
                                                            
3 Results The results of Arellano Bond Autocorrelation for lag (1) and lag (2) given in Annexure 3 
4 Results are provided in Appendix 4(a) and 4(b) 
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MTB Ratio -0.000347 -0.00303*** 
 (0.497) (0.000) 
LIQ 0.0212*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.00439 0.271*** 
 (0.911) (0.000) 
GDP 0.296*** -0.561*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.0840** 0.147*** 
 (0.019) (0.000) 
Observations 3983 3983 
FE Present Present 
Wald Stats 7537.32 7264.06 
p-value  0.000 0.000 
AB test AC(1)  0.000 0.000 
AC(2) 0.1794 0.9147 
p-values in parentheses, * , **, *** at 10, 5, and 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
Table 6 Two-Step System GMM results  
Pre-Crisis Period (2002-2008) 
Dep. Variable BDFR MDFR 
Lag (1) 0.722*** 0.729*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
NDTS -0.927** -1.026** 
 (0.037) (0.032) 
TANGB -0.0118 0.0208 
 (0.805) (0.729) 
Profitability -1.012*** -0.744*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.0495*** 0.0230** 
 (0.001) (0.024) 
MTB Ratio 0.000263 -0.00151** 
 (0.762) (0.022) 
LIQ -0.00352 0.00341 
 (0.421) (0.427) 
Inflation -1.028*** 0.774** 
 (0.005) (0.014) 
GDP -0.0706 -0.130 
 (0.722) (0.479) 
Intercept -0.0913 -0.0524 
 (0.432) (0.561) 
Obs. 1653 1653 
Fixed Effect Present Present 
Wald Stats 583.92 1141.77 
p-value  0.000 0.000 
AC(1) 0.0000 0.000 
AC(2) 0.0477 0.6588 
p-values in Brackets, * , **, *** at 10, 5, and 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
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Table 7 Two-Step System GMM results  
Post Crisis 2009-17 
Dep Variable BDFR MDFR 
Lag(1) 0.673*** 0.481*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
NDTS -1.193** -0.239 
 (0.030) (0.550) 
TANGB 0.148*** 0.137*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) 
Profitability -0.518*** -0.939*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.0654*** 0.115*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
MTB Ratio 0.000367 -0.00910*** 
 (0.839) (0.007) 
LIQ 0.0271*** 0.00701 
 (0.000) (0.277) 
Inflation 0.475*** 0.798*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP 0.881*** -0.319 
 (0.000) (0.134) 
Intercept -0.674*** -1.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2047 2047 
Fixed Effect Present Present 
Wald Stats 1972.28 805.63 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 
AC(1) 0.0000 0.0000 
AC(2) 0.0998 0.1925 
p-values in Brackets, * , **, *** at 10, 5, and 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
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Table 8 Summarized results of the analysis: The table exhibits the comparative description of the 
significant factors for both the measures of DFR in all the study periods. 
BDFR 
  
  
Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post Crisis 
Variables Sign Significance Variables Sign Significance Variables Sign Significance 
BDFR(-1) Positive 1% BDFR(-1) Positive 1% BDFR(-1) Positive 1% 
NDTS Negative 1% NDTS Negative 5% NDTS Negative 5% 
Tangibility Positive 1% Profit Negative 1% Tangibility Positive 1% 
Profit Negative 1% Size Positive 1% Profit Negative 1% 
Liquidity Positive 1% Inflation Negative 1% Size Positive 1% 
GDP Positive 1%    Liquidity Positive 1% 
            Inflation Positive 1% 
            GDP Positive 1% 
MDFR 
  
Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post Crisis 
Variables Sign Significance Variables Sign Significance Variables Sign Significance 
MDFR(-1) Positive 1% MDFR(-1) Positive 1% MDFR(-1) Positive 1% 
NDTS Negative 1% NDTS Negative 5% Tangibility Positive 1% 
Tangibility Positive 1% Profit Negative 1% Profit Negative 1% 
Profit Negative 1% Size Positive 5% Size Positive 1% 
Growth Negative 1% Growth Negative 5% Growth Negative 1% 
Liquidity Positive 1% Inflation Positive 5% Inflation Positive 1% 
Inflation Positive 1%             
GDP Negative 1%             
 
When the study compared the factors affecting DFR based on Book and Market value of the firm, some 
difference is observed, consistent with the argument by (Frank and Goyal (2009). The author mentions 
in his study that, until now, no theory could explain the reasons for such difference. Therefore, in this 
study, the results have been discussed in four sections. Section V. (a) describes the results for the full 
sample for both BDFR and MDFR. Section V. (b). It compares the results for pre and post-crisis for 
BDFR. Section V. (c) compares the results for MDFR for pre and post crisis. 
V(a). Results for 2002-2017: 
The results suggest that NDTS, tangibility, profitability and liquidity are consistent determinants of 
leverage irrespective of the measure of leverage. Growth as defined by MTB ratio and inflation are 
significant for MDFR, the results are consistent with the theory. GDP, an indicator of economic growth 
shows a positive relation with BDFR and negative with MDFR. Whereas the positive relation with 
BDFR is consistent with the theory, the negative relation seems to be mechanical due to the definition 
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of MDFR since the denominator of MDFR is Market Value of the firm that is found to be high during 
expansion. As existing research ( (Frank & Goyal, 2009) suggests that during expansion bankruptcy 
costs declines and taxable income increases. Further share prices have a positive relationship with GDP. 
The study confers that leverage of Indian firms increases with tangibility, liquidity and GDP, whereas 
decrease with NDTS, Profitability and Growth Opportunities. These results are consistent with major 
previous theories in India and abroad [ (Sheridan Titman, 1988); (Rajan, 1995); (Laurence Booth, 
2001); (Bhaduri, 2002); (L. M. Bhole, 2005); (Chakraborty, 2010); (Sulagna Mukherjee, 2012); (Basu, 
2015).  
The positive and high significance of lagged leverage variable, irrespective of measure of leverage in 
GMM, implies that Indian firms tend to adjust their capital structure to optimum level of debt or ‘Target 
Leverage’. This is consistent with the results of (G (Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, 2002),  (Bhaduri, 2002)  
and (Basu, 2015) . This is confirmed in the whole sample and sub sample periods. An interesting 
observation is that the coefficient on lagged leverage variable is less after the crisis in comparison to 
the pre-crisis period, suggesting that though crisis did not impact the adjustment process by the firms 
but it did impact the speed of adjustment and it lowered the speed of adjustment by Indian non-financial 
firms. 
   
V. (b) Pre and Post-crisis impact on BDFR 
With the book measure of leverage, as the dependent variable, it is found that NDTS, profitability and 
size are significant determinants of leverage during both the periods. NDTS and profitability are 
negatively related with BDFR suggesting that with high-tax  shields, companies do not prefer taking 
debt as they are not able to reap tax advantage and with high profitability the need for debt reduces. The 
factors tangibility and liquidity, however, show variation as they are not significant during the pre-crisis 
period but show significance after the crisis, in the determination of leverage; in confirmation with the 
theory, both the variables are positively related to leverage. This has an important implication, since, it 
throws light on the role of institutions and their processes in lending funds to firms. It implies that 
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NDTS and profitability influence leverage choices made by firms and are unaffected by the crisis. 
Similarly, size may give some advantage to firms and give large firms easy access to the debt market 
and hence may be categorized as one influencing firms’ choice. In line with the theoretical explanations, 
high tangibility opens prospects for taking higher debt as it can be kept as collateral with lenders, also 
liquidity ensures timely payment of interest and principal to lending authorities. These factors can be 
categorized as ones influencing the institution’s decision towards lending. It further implies that the 
crisis may have caused learning for lenders and their improved processes. Tangibility and liquidity seem 
to influence lenders’ decisions in post-crisis analysis leading to higher leverage for firms with high 
tangibility and liquidity. The results reveal important information which can also explain the current 
economic situation of non-performing assets of financial institutions.  
Economic indicators show a negative relation of inflation with leverage in the pre-crisis period and 
positive relation in the post-crisis period. Economic growth measured through GDP does not show 
significance during the pre-crisis period but shows a positive influence in the post-crisis period. 
   
IV. (c). Pre and Post-crisis impact on determinants of MDFR 
Firm’s profitability and size remain significant determinants of market leverage in both pre and post-
crisis. NDTS is found to be significant in the pre-crisis period and turns insignificant in the post-crisis 
period. Growth, as measured by MTB ratio, is negatively related to market leverage, inflation is 
positively related to MDFR and GDP is not significant during both the periods.  
 
V. Summary and Conclusion: 
This study tries to seek the answer of two questions viz. “What are important determinants of Debt 
Financing Ratio (DFR) for Indian non financial listed firms?”  “How has sub prime crisis impacted the 
above-identified determinants?” For this objective, the study identifies significant and consistent firm-
specific (NDTS, Tangibility, Size, Profitability, Growth Opportunities and Liquidity) and institutional 
21 
 
specific (Inflation and GDP growth rate) determinants of DFR. DFR has been defined in terms of book 
and market value of firms. The study collected micro and macro panel data for 306 Indian non financial 
firms for the period of 2002-2017 and divided the time frame in three-period,  i.e. full sample period 
(2002-2017), Pre-Crisis Period (2002-2008) and Post-Crisis Period (2009-2017). Dynamic Panel Data 
modeling has been adopted and empirical estimation was done using Two-Step System GMM to 
estimate the coefficients of the models and their statistical significance. For full sample period, the 
results show that DFR (for both book and market measures of leverage) of the sample Indian firms 
increases with increase tangibility and liquidity whereas it decreases with increase in non-debt tax shield 
and profitability. The positive and high significance of lagged leverage variable, irrespective of measure 
of leverage implies that Indian firms tend to adjust their capital structure to a ‘Target Leverage’. Size is 
not a significant factor in the full sample period. Growth opportunities (MTB) for the firm, inflation 
and GDP show inconsistent results with different measures of leverage, partially explained by existing 
theory. 
Profitability and size are robust determinants of leverage in both pre and post-crisis periods.  
Profitability is found negatively related whereas the size is positively related to leverage. Tangibility is 
found not relevant in the pre-crisis period whereas it is found statistically significant in the post-crisis 
period for both measures of leverage. Other factors show inconsistent results for both the measures in 
full and sub sample periods.  
The study has an important finding based on the analysis of Book measure-based model of leverage. 
The factors tangibility and liquidity show different behavior in pre and post-crisis period. They are not 
found to be significant during the pre-crisis period but after the crisis, they show significance in the 
determination of leverage. These findings throw light on the process of financial institutions in lending 
funds to firms. In line with the theoretical explanations, high tangibility increases prospects for firms 
for taking higher debt as it can be kept as collateral with lenders and liquidity ensures timely payment 
of interest and principal amount to lending authorities. These factors can be categorized as  influencing 
the institution’s decision towards lending to firms. It further implies that the crisis may have caused a 
learning for lenders and their improved processes by implementing laid down policies after the crisis. 
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Tangibility and liquidity seem to influence lending decisions in the post crisis period; leading to higher 
leverage for firms with high tangibility and liquidity. The results also indicate that it is more appropriate 
to model liquidity and tangibility as institutional factors rather than firm specific factors affecting capital 
structure of Indian firms. The results suggest to investigate further the role of tangibility and liquidity 
on non-performing assets of financial institutions in India.  
Annexure 1:  Definitions of variables and their proxies: 
 
Dependent Variable: This study has used two measures of leverage one is book and second is the 
market-based  definition. Book Debt Financing Ratio (BDFR) is the ratio of total debt and sum of Total 
Long-Term Debt and  Book Value of Equity. Market Debt Financing  Ratio (MDFR) is the ratio of 
Total Long-Term Debt and the sum of total debt and market value of equity. Long-Term Debt excludes 
the short term liabilities of the firms. 
Immediate past leverage: The proxy for lagged leverage is the leverage at the time  (t-1).  
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS): The study has taken the ratio of Depreciation to Total Assets. 
Tangibility (TANGB): The ratio of Fixed Asset with respect to fixed and non-fixed assets available in 
the firm, as an attribute for tangibility. 
Profitability (PROFIT): The ratio of Earning Before Interest, Tax, Dividend and Amortization of 
capital expenditure and Total Assets. It is the overall measure of returns on Assets (EBITDA / Total 
Assets ). 
Size: Study has used the proxy for Size as a natural logarithmic value of sales after-sales returns. 
Market to Book Value (MTB Ratio): In this study market-to-book asset ratio has been used as a proxy 
for future growth prospect of the firm and it is computed using formula MTB Ratio=(No. of Outstanding 
shares × closing price of share) /  Book Value of Assets.  
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Liquidity (LIQ): Liquidity refers to the convertibility of assets into cash without losing value and 
delaying in time. The standard measurement of liquidity as the ratio of Current Asset to Current 
Liabilities, hence, this study considered the standard measure of liquidity for this attribute. 
Inflation: Study has taken the change in consumer price index as a proxy for inflation. 
Domestic GDP growth rate (GDP): This study has considered this factor to account the business cycle 
and included GDP as a proxy for the state of the business cycle in the economy. 
Annexure 2: Unit root test for stationarity  
 
Null Hypothesis: The series contains unit root 
Alternate Hypothesis: Series does not contain unit root 
Variables Method T-Stat. P-Value Description 
BDFR Levin, Lin & Chu  -640.972 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 746.524 0.00 
 
MDFR Levin, Lin & Chu  -1936.01 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 966.736 0.00 
 
NDTS Levin, Lin & Chu  -18.3853 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 983.898 0.00 
 
TANGB Levin, Lin & Chu  -23.8669 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 903.542 0.00 
 
Profit Levin, Lin & Chu  -6.36784 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 1047.75 0.00 
 
Size Levin, Lin & Chu  -17.5225 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 935.153 0.00 
 
MTB Levin, Lin & Chu  -67.3682 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 976.017 0.00 
 
GDP Levin, Lin & Chu  -41.1177 0.00 At Level with intercept 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 3356.94 0.00 
 
Inflation Levin, Lin & Chu  -8.60108 0.00 At Level with no intercept and trend 
 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 451.14 0.00 
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Annexure 3: The results of Arellano Bond Autocorrelation for lag (1) and lag (2).  
H0: No autocorrelation in first or second differenced errors. 
Ha: Autocorrelation in first or second differenced errors. 
Table 4 Arellano Bond Autocorrelation for lag (1) and lag (2). 
Variables Full sample period 
(2002-2017 
Pre- Crisis (2002-2008) Post -Crisis(2009-2017) 
Acceptance / Rejection 
(criterion) 
Z – 
Statistics 
Prob > z 
(Prob.-
value) 
Z – 
Statistics 
Prob > z 
(Prob.-
value) 
Z – 
Statistics 
Prob > z 
(Prob.-
value) 
Book value 
measure of 
leverage 
Lag(1) -8.4658 0.0000*** 5.1393 0.0000*** 4.8113 0.0000*** 
Lag(2) -1.3425 0.1794 1.9804 0.0477 1.6459 0.0998 
Market value 
measure of 
leverage 
Lag(1) -11.047 0.0000*** -6.7923 0.0000*** -6.4636 0.0000*** 
Lag(2) 0.1071 0.9147 0.44158 0.6588 -1.3032 0.1925 
*** represents rejection of null hypothesis at 1 percent level of significance. 
 
Annexure 4(a): Standard Errors with Pooled, GMM and Two-Step System GMM 
 
Variables 
Fixed 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Differenced 
GMM 
One Step 
GMM 
Two-Step System 
GMM 
Intercept 0.043 0.037 0.069 0.058 0.036 
NDTS 0.233 0.215 0.270 0.277 0.171 
TANGB 0.030 0.026 0.038 0.038 0.024 
Profit 0.045 0.043 0.050 0.049 0.031 
Size 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003 
MB 
Ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
LIQ 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Inflation 0.095 0.095 0.079 0.080 0.039 
GDP 0.156 0.158 0.131 0.135 0.061 
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Annexure 4(b) Comparisons of Standard Errors 
 
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
.24
.28
Int
erc
ep
t
ND
TS
TA
NG
B
Pr
ofi
tab
ility Siz
e
MB
Ra
tio LIQ
Inf
lat
ion GD
P
Differenced GMM Fixed Effect
One Step GMM Random Effect
Two Step System GMM
St
an
da
rd
 E
rro
rs
 o
f E
st
im
at
es
 
 
 
References:  
Arellano Manuel, S. B. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and 
an application to employment equations. The review of economic studies 58(2), 277-297. 
Asli Demirguc-Kunt, M. S.-P. (2015, December). The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Firm's 
Capital Structure . Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank Group, pp. 2-58. 
Bajpai, N. (2011). Global financial crisis, its impact on India and the policy response. Columbia: 
columbia.edu. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2014). Econometric analysis of panel data. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Basu, K. (2015). Market Imperfections and Optimal Capital Structure: Evidence from Indian Panel 
Data. Global Business Review 16(1) , 61–83. 
Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, S. N. (2002). Determinants of Capital Structure in India (1990-1998): A 
Dynamic Panel Data Approach. Journal of Economic Integration, 17(4), 761-776. 
Bhaduri, S. N. (2002). Determinants of capital structure choice: a study of the Indian corporate sector. 
Applied Financial Economics, 12:9, 655-665. 
Bond, R. B. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal 
of econometrics, 87(1), 115-143. 
26 
 
Bover, M. A. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components 
models. Journal of econometrics, 68(1), 29-51. 
C. D Dick, M. S. (2013). Macro-expectations, aggregate uncertainty, and expected term premia. 
European Economic Review, 58, 58-80. 
Chakraborty, I. (2010). Capital structure in an emerging stock market: The case of India. Research in 
international business and finance, 24(3),, 295-314. 
Donaldson, G. (1961). Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and the 
Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity,. Boston: Division of Research, Harvard Graduate 
School of Business Administration. 
Durand, D. (1952). Costs of Debt and Equity Funds for Business: Trends and Problems of 
Measurement. Conference on Research in Business Finance (pp. 215 - 262). New York: 
NBER. 
Flannery, M. J., & Rangan, K. P. (2006). Partial adjustment toward target capital structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 469-506. 
Franco Modigliani, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment . The American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, 261-297. 
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably 
important?. Financial management 38, no. 1, 1-37. 
Harris Milton, A. R. (1991). "The Theory of Capital Structure". The Journal of Finance, XLVI, 297-
355. 
Harry DeAngelo, a. R. (1980). Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation. 
Journal of financial economics 8, no. 1 , 3-29. 
Herwadkar, S. S. (2017, March). Corporate Leverage in EMEs:. RBI Working Paper Series No. 04. 
J. R. Graham and C. R. Harvey. (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from 
the field. Journal of financial economics, 60(2-3), 187-243. 
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance and Takeover. American 
Economic Review, 323-29. 
L. M. Bhole, J. M. (2005). Trends and Determinants of Private Corporate Sector Savings in India. 
Economic and Political Weekly, No. 40, 4243-4250. 
Laurence Booth, V. A.-K. (2001). Capital Structures in Developing Countries. The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 56, No. 1 ( 2001), 87-130. 
Litzenberger, A. K. (1973). A State-Preference Model of Optimal Financial Leverage. The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 28, No. 4, 911-922 . 
Malcolm Baker, J. W. (2002). Market Timing and Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, 
No. 1, 1-32. 
Marsh, P. (1982). The choice between equity and debt: An empirical study. The Journal of finance, 
37(1),, 121-144. 
Miller, F. M. (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American 
economic review 53.3, 433-443. 
27 
 
Murray Z. Frank, V. K. (2003). Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure. Journal of 
financial economics 67.2 , 217-248. 
Myers, S. C. ( 1984). The capital structure puzzle. The journal of finance, 39(3), 574-592. 
Myres, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics, 147-175. 
Palepu, K. G. (1986). Predicting takeover targets: A methodological and empirical analysis. Journal 
of accounting and economics, 8(1), 3-35. 
R. S. Gürkaynak, J. H. (2012). Macroeconomics and the term structure. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 50(2), 331-67. 
R. Stulz, H. J. (1985). An analysis of secured debt. Journal of financial Economics, 14(4), 501-521. 
Rajan, R. G. (1995). What do we know about capital structure ? Journal of Finance, 1421-1456. 
Roger G. Ibbotson, J. L. (1994). The market's problems with the pricing of initial public offerings. 
Journal of applied corporate finance 7.1, 66-74. 
Roodman, D. (2009). A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Oxford Bulletin Of Economic 
and Statistics, 71, 1, 135-158. 
S. C. Myers, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information 
that investors do not have. Journal of financial economics, 13(2), 187-221. 
S. J. Grossman, O. D. (1982). Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives. In The 
economics of information and uncertainty . University of Chicago Press., 107-140. 
Sheridan Titman, R. W. (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The Journal of finance 
43.1 , 1-19. 
Subbarao, D. (2009). Impact of the global financial crisis on India: Collateral damage and response. 
Symposium on The Global Economic Crisis and Challenges for the Asian Economy in a 
Changing World (p. (Vol. 18)). Tokyo, JAPAN: Institute for International Monetary Affairs. 
Sulagna Mukherjee, J. M. (2012). Historical Market-to-Book Ratio and Corporate Capital Structure: 
Evidence from India. Global Business Review, 13(2) 339–350 , 339–350. 
Taggart, R. A. (1977). A model of corporate financing decisions. The Journal of Finance, 32(5),, 
1467-1484. 
Tracy, J. A. (1986). Oligopoly and financial structure: The limited liability effect. The American 
Economic Review , 956-970. 
Warner, J. B. (1977). Bankruptcy costs: Some evidence. The journal of Finance, 32(2),, 337-347. 
Welch, I. ( 2011). Two Common Problems in Capital Structure Research: The FinancialDebt-To-
Asset Ratio and Issuing Activity Versus Leverage Changes. International Review of Finance, 
11:1, 1–17. 
Zhiguo, D. W. (2014). A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang. The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. LXIX, NO. 2, 719-762. 
 
 
